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FUNDAMENTAL ENTERPRISE INCOME TAX REFORM
IN CHINA: MOTIVATIONS AND MAJOR CHANGES
Jinyan Li*

I. INTRODUCTION
On 16 March 2007, the National People's Congress of China promulgated
a new Enterprise Income Tax Law1 (EIT Law) to take effect on 1 January
2008. It is the first law in Chinese history that imposes an income tax on
all forms of enterprise. It replaces the current FIE Income Tax Law2
applicable to enterprises with foreign direct investment and the Interim
Enterprise Income Tax Regulations3 (Interim EIT Regulations) applicable
to Chinese-owned enterprises. Most notably, the EIT Law abolishes the
tax incentives applicable only to foreign-investment enterprises (FIEs) and
introduces a general tax rate that is internationally competitive. The
promulgation of the EIT Law symbolizes the maturity of China's tax
*

Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Canada; and Senior Fellow,
Taxation Law and Policy Research Institute, Monash University, Australia. I thank He
Huang for her excellent research assistance and David Piccolo for his comments on the
draft of this article. Email: jinyanli@osgoode.yorku.ca
1

Enterprise Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China, promulgated by
the 5th Session of the Tenth National People's Congress, 16 March 2007 (hereafter "EIT
Law"). The Chinese text of the law is available at the State Administration of Taxation
web site: www.chinatax.gov.cn. An unofficial English translation is available at
www.kpmg.com.cn and www.lehmanlaw.com.
2

Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China on Foreign-Investment
Enterprises and Foreign Enterprises, Chairman Order [1991], No. 45 (hereafter "FIE
Income Tax Law"). The Chinese text is available at the State Administration of Taxation
web site, supra note 1.
3

Interim Regulations on Enterprise Income Tax, State Council Order [1993], No.
137 (hereafter "Interim EIT Regulations"). This was a consolidation of the Interim StateOwned Enterprise Income Tax (18 September 1984), State-Owned Enterprise Income
Regulatory Tax (18 September 1984), Interim Collective Enterprise Income Tax (11
April 1985), and Interim Private Enterprise Income Tax (25 June 1988), all introduced by
the State Council.
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policy, China's commitment to the principles of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) and China's confidence in its economic development
policy.
This article provides some background on this fundamental tax reform and
an overview of the key changes and their implications. Part 2 briefly
discusses the evolution of the current tax system, and Part 3 examines the
motivations behind the promulgation of the EIT Law. The major changes
in the tax rules and policies are discussed in Part 4. Part 5 concludes the
article with some comments on the preliminary impact of the reform.

II. THE CURRENT TAX SYSTEM
A. THE DUAL-TRACK SYSTEM
The current enterprise income tax system came into existence in the early
1980s.4 At that time, China was trying to "get across the river [from a
command economy to a market-based economy] by feeling the stones on
the river bed" (mozhe shitou guohe). There was no bridge or precedence to
guide China's economic transition. China had never had an income tax5 or
a legal tradition familiar to foreign investors.6 The previous Maoist regime
4

See note 3, supra, for the introduction of some taxes. The Chinese-Foreign
Equity Joint Venture Income Tax (EJVIT) Law was promulgated in 1980; the Income
Tax Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning Foreign Enterprises was
promulgated in 1981 (hereafter "FEIT" or "FEIT Law").
5

When the modern income tax was introduced in the United States (1913) and
Canada (1917), China was undergoing civil wars and political turmoil, which ended when
the Communist Party declared the establishment of the People's Republic on 1 October
1949. After 1949, foreign capital left China, and domestic private capital was confiscated.
Capitalism and markets were incompatible with the Communist Party-led socialism. The
absence of international investment and business transactions eliminated any need for
international taxation. When foreign investors were allowed back into China in the late
1970s, it was considered appropriate to impose an income tax on them.
6

For more discussion on Chinese legal traditions, see Peerenboom, Randall,
China's Long March toward Rule of Law (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2002); Lubman, Stanley B., Bird in a Cage -- Legal Reform in China after Mao
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press (1999); Lubman, Stanley B., "Looking for
Law in China", 20 Columbia Journal of Asian Law 1 (2006); Hsu, Stephen C. (ed.),
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left behind institutions that could not adequately support a legal system
appropriate for a market-driven economy. The government under the
leadership of Deng Xiaoping adopted a pragmatic, evolutionary approach
to reform.7 Foreign direct investment (FDI) was to be encouraged, but kept
separate from the domestic sector and subject to different regulatory
regimes. In terms of taxation, the income of enterprises receiving FDI and
FIEs (including equity joint ventures (EJVs), contractual joint ventures,
wholly foreign-owned enterprises, and joint-stock companies with foreign
shareholders) was taxed differently from the income derived by Chineseowned enterprises.8

B. PREFERENTIAL TAX REGIME FOR FDI
The income taxes imposed by the FIE Income Tax Law (1991) and its
predecessors (the EJVIT and FEIT Laws)9 are similar to the income taxes
in Western countries. A main policy objective of these taxes is to attract
FDI. This was accomplished by following the international tax norms,
adopting low tax rates, and offering generous tax incentives. China's
Understanding China's legal system: essays in honor of Jerome A. Cohen (New York:
New York University Press, 2003); and Ren, Xin, Tradition of the Law and Law of the
Tradition (1997).
7

More importantly, the Communist Party was not interested in reforming the
political system while embarking on economic reforms. How could market capitalism
coexist with a Communist-led "people's democratic dictatorship"? There were, of course,
no readily available answers to any of these questions. The Chinese leadership has
resisted the advice of international experts to go for "big bang" economic reforms in
favour of a more gradual, pragmatic approach. For more discussion, see Peerenboom,
Randall, "What Have We Learned about Law and Development? Describing, Predicting,
and Assessing Legal Reforms in China", 27 Michigan Journal of International Law 823
(2006); and Peerenboom, supra note 6, at 197.
8

For an overview of the evolution of China's tax system, see Brean, Don (ed.),
Taxation in Modern China (New York and London: Routledge, 1998); Easson, Alex and
Jinyan Li, Taxation of Foreign Investment in the People's Republic of China (The Hague:
Kluwer, 1989); Fulton, T., Daniel Xu and Jinyan Li (eds.), China's Tax Reform Options
(New York: World Scientific, 1998); Li, Jinyan, Taxation in the People's Republic of
China (New York: Praeger, 1991); and Moser, Michael and Winston Zee, China Tax
Guide (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).
9

FIE Income Tax Law, supra note 2; EJVIT Law and FEIT Law, supra note 4.
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extensive treaty network covers these taxes and preserves China's tax
incentives, mostly through a tax sparing credit in China's treaties with
capital-exporting countries (with the notable exception of the United
States).
International experience and tax norms were among the "stepping stones"
used by Chinese officials in the early 1980s. The text of the basic tax
legislation of selected developed countries (notably the United States, the
United Kingdom and Japan) and developing countries (Brazil, Mexico and
Singapore) as well as the OECD Model Tax Convention and the UN
Model Convention was translated into Chinese. International tax experts
provided crash courses on the fundamental international tax principles.
Some Chinese officials were sent to study abroad. To the extent possible,
the EJVIT Law adopted international tax concepts and principles,
including the principle of worldwide taxation and the prevention of double
taxation through a foreign tax credit.
The lack of a legal tradition familiar to Western investors and the absence
of administrative experience with a modern tax law meant that the new
income tax law had to provide sufficient "certainty" and legal assurances
to foreign investors while being administratively feasible. The form of the
legislation is "fa" or "law".10 In China's legislative hierarchy, it is the
highest form of legislation and must be passed by the legislature -- the
National People's Congress. The appearance of "the rule of law" was used
only in the tax legislation applicable to foreign investors. Meanwhile, the
EJVIT Law was a model of legislative simplicity. The whole text
consisted of fewer than 1,000 Chinese characters and 18 articles.11
Consistent with Chinese legal tradition, great powers were given to the tax
administration. For example, the eligibility to receive most tax incentives
required the pre-approval of the tax authorities.
10

"Law" is a statute enacted by the National People's Congress. China deemed it
important to subject foreign investors to tax "laws", not just "interim regulations" or
"administrative rules", in order to convey a sense of "the rule of law" to foreign investors.
11

Arts. 1 to 7 set forth the rules for tax jurisdiction, determination of the tax base,
the tax rate and tax incentives. Art. 16 provided the foreign tax credit as the method of
relieving international double taxation. The remaining ten articles were devoted to
administrative matters, such as filing returns, the tax authorities' powers of investigation,
dispute resolution and tax penalties.
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It was also clear at the beginning that tax policy would be used to attract
FDI. Initially, foreign businessmen advised China to offer tax incentives
for FDI.12 Chinese officials were aware of the tax incentives being offered
by Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and other
countries.13 They were advised that some international experts questioned
the efficiency and effectiveness of tax incentives,14 but remained
concerned that China would be unable to compete for FDI unless it offered
tax incentives similar to those provided elsewhere.15 The EJVIT Law
therefore granted tax incentives in the form of tax holidays and a
reinvestment tax refund.16 Similar incentives were available under the
FEIT Law. However, because China was not very enthusiastic about
foreign companies operating in China without a local equity partner
(typically a state-owned enterprise), the incentives under the FEIT Law
were less generous.17
During the 1980s and 1990s, there was a huge boom in establishing
12

See Pomp, Richard and Stanley Surrey, "The Tax Structure of the People's
Republic of China", 20 Virginia Journal of International Law 1 (1979), at 12.
13

See Liu, Longheng, Introduction to Chinese Tax Law (Beijing University Press,
1986), at 240 (in Chinese).
14

Pomp and Surrey, supra note 12, at 12.

15

Id.

16

The standard tax holiday was three years (a one-year exemption and two years
of a half reduction), starting in the first profit-making year. An extended holiday of ten
years was available to EJVs engaged in low-profit operations in farming and forestry or
located in remote, economically underdeveloped areas. Forty per cent of the income tax
paid on the amount of profit reinvested in China would be refunded. Obtaining any of the
tax preferences depended on the prior approval of the Ministry of Finance. The EJVIT
Law formally incorporated the tax incentives previously promised in the EJV Law. The
EJV Law provided that the income tax (which was not yet in existence) payable by
Chinese-foreign EJVs was to be reduced or waived if the foreign investors brought "upto-date" technology to the joint venture or if the profit made in China was reinvested in
China.
17

For example, a three-year tax holiday was available only if the investment was
scheduled to operate for at least ten years in farming, forestry, animal husbandry or other
low-profit operations. Upon approval by the Ministry of Finance, an additional tax
reduction of 15% to 30% was available. Chinese-source investment income, including
interest, rents and royalties, was subject to a 20% withholding tax.
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special preferential tax regimes for FDI. A major aspect of China's FDI
policy was development region by region. The strategy was to concentrate
limited resources for improving the infrastructure in small geographic
areas. Another aspect of the policy was to encourage export, which could
not only earn foreign currency, but also keep FDI separate from the
domestic market.
Four "special economic zones" (SEZs) were created in 1980 along the
south coast: Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou in Guangdong Province (and
close to Hong Kong) and Xiamen in Fujian Province (across from
Taiwan).18 They were created to attract investors in general and investors
from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan in particular. The State Council
introduced temporary rules to grant special tax reductions and exemptions
in the SEZs.19 These tax preferences applied to all forms of FDI and were
more generous than those under the existing EJVIT and FEIT Laws. For
example, the general tax rate was 15% (as opposed to 30%); the local tax
was waived; the tax holiday was longer (five years instead of three) for
"productive"
enterprises
(those
engaged
in
manufacturing,
communications and transport, agriculture, forestry, or animal husbandry);
the refund for reinvestment was 100% (as opposed to 40%); and the 10%
withholding tax on dividends (or profit distributions) was waived. Most
significantly, the SEZs set precedents for the authorities to establish
preferences which help channel foreign capital and technology to other
designated priority areas.
Fourteen "coastal economic open cities" were designated in 1984, and
certain areas in them were designated as "economic and technological
development areas" and others as "old urban districts".20 The tax
18

For more discussion on the SEZs, see Crane, George, The Political Economy of
China's Special Economic Zones (1990); and Bucknall, Kevin B., China and the Open
Door Policy (1989), at 143-167.
19

See Provisional Regulations of the State Council of the People's Republic of
China Regarding the Reduction of and Exemption from Enterprise Income Tax and
Consolidated Industrial and Commercial Tax in the Special Economic Zones and the
Fourteen Coastal Cities, promulgated by the State Council on 15 November 1984.
20

The 14 coastal cities were Tianjin, Shanghai, Dalian, Qinhuangdao, Yantai,
Qingdao, Lianyungang, Nantong, Ningbo, Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Zhanjiang and
Beihai. The list of "coastal economic open regions" was later expanded to cover over 170
cities and counties in eight provinces.
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incentives in the economic and technological development areas were very
close to those in the SEZs, but the incentives in the coastal economic open
cities were less generous.21 Many "coastal economic open regions",
consisting of urban and rural areas in the Yangtze and Pearl River Deltas,
and the South Fujian region, were designated in 1985.22
In addition to special regions, special FDI projects or activities received
preferential tax treatment. The two most well-known types of projects
were export-oriented23 and technologically advanced.24 On top of any tax
exemption and reduction to which a taxpayer was entitled, the tax rate was
reduced to 15% in general and 10% in the SEZs.25 For technologically
advanced enterprises, the tax rate was reduced by half for three years
following the standard tax holiday. Reinvestment in either type of
enterprise was eligible for a full refund of the tax paid on the reinvested
profit. Other preferred investments included infrastructure projects,26
"productive" activities, agriculture and animal husbandry. Services and
passive investments were not encouraged.
21

See Jiang, Zhaodong, "China's Tax Preferences to Foreign Investment: Policy,
Culture and Modern Concepts", 18 Northwestern Journal of International Law &
Business 549 (1998), at 611. For example, a reduced 15% tax rate applied to EJVs,
contractual joint ventures and wholly foreign-owned enterprises in the old urban districts
which were technology or know-how intensive and had an investment exceeding USD 30
million and a long investment recovery period or if the projects related to energy,
transport or port construction.
22

See Jiang, id.

23

"Export-oriented enterprises" were enterprises that produced goods mainly (over
70%) for export and maintained a net positive foreign exchange balance at the end of the
year.
24

"Technologically advanced enterprises" were enterprises which, with advanced
technology provided by foreign investors, were able to develop new products or upgrade
existing ones and therefore earn foreign exchange through exports or import substitution.
25

The tax rate was reduced to 10% for FIEs in the economic and technology
development areas or other areas where the enterprise income tax rate was already 15%.
26

Irrespective of the location of the investment, the tax rate was reduced to 15%
for EJVs in port and berth construction projects. New projects scheduled to operate for 15
years or more were eligible for a ten-year tax holiday (a five-year exemption followed by
a five-year 50% reduction in tax). The tax holiday might be extended upon approval by
the Ministry of Finance. The withholding tax on profit distributions was waived as was
the local income tax. See Jiang, supra note 21.
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The formal tax discrimination between EJVs and other forms of FDI
seemed to make little sense by the end of the 1980s. By then, the majority
of FDI was either located in special areas or involved in preferred
investment projects, thus receiving similar tax preferences whether or not
the form was an EJV. In 1991, the EJVIT and FEIT Laws were
consolidated into the FIE Income Tax Law,27 but the existing tax
incentives were preserved. After 1991, new tax incentives continued to be
granted. The Pudong New District was created in the city of Shanghai28 in
order to develop Shanghai into a world-class financial centre. Other
"special" regions included western regions, north-east regions, border
cities, bonded zones, tourist and resort areas, and "high and new
technology industrial development areas".29 The rise of special areas away
from the coastal regions effectively made the special tax regimes in the
coastal regions less special. The coastal regions therefore created new
types of special zones to remain competitive, including bonded zones, free
trade zones, high and new industrial development zones, Taiwan
investment zones, the Singapore-Suzhou industrial park, and tourist and
resort zones.30

C. TAXATION OF DOMESTICALLY-FUNDED ENTERPRISES
State-owned enterprises, collective enterprises and private enterprises are
currently taxed under different regulations, which were originally
introduced in 1984 and subsequently (in 1993) consolidated into the
27

See notes 2 and 4, supra. For an overview of the tax implications for foreign
investors, see Curley, Stephen and Darren Fortunato, "Tax Considerations for Investors in
China: A Preliminary Look", 20 North Carolina Journal of International Law and
Commerce Regulation 531 (1995); Li, Jinyan, "Tax Implications of Doing Business in
China", 43 Canadian Tax Journal 75 (1995); Li, Jinyan, "Taxation of Foreign Business
and Investment in the People's Republic of China", 7 International Business and Tax
Lawyer 120 (1989); and Lin, Kenny, "Income Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment in
China", 25 International Tax Journal 78 (1999).
28

See Jiang, supra note 21, at 580-589.

29

Id.

30

Id.
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Interim EIT Regulations.31 Although the Interim EIT Regulations and the
FIE Income Tax Law have the same statutory rate of 33%, the effective
tax rate for FIEs is about 10 percentage points lower because of the tax
incentives discussed above and the limitations on deductions in the Interim
EIT Regulations. For example, while the FIE Income Tax Law allows a
full deduction for the interest expenses incurred for income-producing
purposes, the Interim EIT Regulations limit the deduction to the interest
charged at the rate set by government-owned financial institutions. As
such, many enterprises cannot deduct the full interest expenses because
they had to borrow from non-state-owned banks that charged a higher
interest rate. Similarly, wages and salaries are not deductible under the
Interim EIT Regulations if the amount exceeds the standard amount
specified by the government. With the liberalization of the labour market,
the government-specified wage standard is much lower than the wages
paid by enterprises, especially non-state-owned enterprises. This means
that the excessive cost is not tax deductible.
So long as the foreign-funded firms did not compete with Chinese firms,
the most effective way of using the tax system to attract FDI was to give
tax incentives only to foreign investors.32 By the turn of the century,
especially after China's accession to the WTO in 2001, the FDI tax policy
was under close scrutiny and heatedly debated. When local firms began to
suffer from the preferential treatment given to foreigners, China switched
to a universally low corporate tax rate of 25%.

III. MOTIVATIONS FOR TAX REFORM
In explaining the draft law to the National People's Congress, the Minister
of Finance identified the following as the guiding principles for the new
law:33
31

See note 3, supra.

32

As discussed below, such differential policy resulted in round-tripping.
However, round-tripping was presumably not considered a serious problem because
China did not make it very difficult for those engaged in round-tripping. The alternative
would have been to grant tax incentives to all taxpayers, which would be costly in terms
of revenue.
33

Jin, Renqing, Minister of Finance, "Explanation on Draft Enterprise Income Tax

10
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-equal taxation of all enterprises;
-the promotion of overall, sustainable development of China's
economy;
-reference to the international tax norms and practices; and
-efficiency in tax administration and simplicity in compliance.

A. EQUAL/NEUTRAL TAXATION
The hallmark of the new EIT Law is equal taxation of all enterprises,
irrespective of the source of capital. Foreign-funded and domesticallyfunded enterprises are taxable under the same rules. The tax preferences
that were available only to FIEs are now abolished or are to be phased out
in five years. As discussed in more detail below, this shift in tax policy
indicates China's confidence in attracting FDI without tax incentives.
China initially introduced the FDI tax incentives in part to compensate
investors for the lack of market or investment conditions. During the early
years of the reform, these incentives played a positive role in attracting
investment, which in turn promoted the development of a market
mechanism in China and propelled economic growth. However, the
differential tax policy was difficult to maintain when FIEs were allowed
greater access to the Chinese internal market, especially after China's
accession to the WTO in 2001. Foreign firms have gradually been allowed
to own up to 50% of enterprises in sensitive industries, such as telecoms,
banking and insurance. Multinational companies have taken over Chinese
companies in a quest for economies of scale. The FDI tax incentives have
aided such foreign takeovers. In 2006, foreign investors controlled the
majority of assets in 21 out of 28 major industrial sectors.34 Given the
large amount of FDI in China, domestically-funded companies are facing
tax discrimination in addition to the challenges resulting from the control
and market power of multinational firms on the Chinese market. The
potential dominance of key economic sectors by multinational firms,
Law". The full text of the speech in English is available at www.chinaembassy.org/eng/gyzg/t302221.htm (visited on 31 July 2007).
34

Shi, Weigan, "A Reexamination of the Role of Foreign Investors", 1 September
2006, available at finance.sina.com.cn (in Chinese).

2007] FUNDAMENTAL ENTERPRISE INCOME TAX REFORM IN CHINA 11

assisted by the tax system, became a serious concern.35 Chinese-owned
enterprises cried for "national treatment" from their own government. The
Minister of Finance, Jin Renqing, acknowledged this in his explanation of
the draft law to the National People's Congress:36
Great changes have taken place in China's economy and
society, and the socialist market economy has initially
taken shape. With China's accession to the WTO, the
Chinese domestic market has been further open to foreign
capital; domestic enterprises have gradually integrated
themselves into the world economy and are facing everincreasing competition. If different tax policies continued
to be implemented for domestic and foreign-funded
enterprises, the former would definitely be put at a
competitive disadvantage and the establishment of a unified
market with standardized and fair competition would be
obstructed.

B. PROMOTING SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The EIT Law represents a fundamental change in China's tax policy -from the preferential taxation of FDI to the neutral taxation of all
enterprises. It also reflects a fundamental shift in China's economic
development strategy -- from a focus on FDI-led manufacturing and
export to a focus on technology and sustainable economic development.37
The FDI preferential tax policy was geared to promote the former model
of development and regional development, and its effectiveness and
efficiency has become questionable in recent years.

35

See Fung, Hung-Gay, Julius Johnson, Jr. and Yanda Xu, "Winners and Losers:
Foreign Firms in China's Emerging Market", 37 The Chinese Economy 5 (No. 3, 2004).
36
37

Jin, supra note 33.

For an overview of this policy shift, see Whalley, John and Weimin Zhou,
"Technology Upgrading and China's Growth Strategy to 2020", Centre for International
Governance
and
Innovation
(CIGI)
(March
2007),
available
at
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=982232.

12
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There is no denial that FDI has been considered to be the "engine" of
China's rapid economic growth: FIEs contributed about 0.4% to China's
annual GDP growth during the 1990s,38 helped China build a highly
competitive and dynamic manufacturing sector for exports,39 and affected
China's economic growth through the diffusion of ideas and transfer of
technology.40 However, the extent to which FDI was attracted to China
because of its tax incentives or whether the incentives were economically
efficient is unclear.
Scholars who argue that the tax incentives were effective in attracting FDI
to China41 often refer to the general data on the FDI growth in China42 and
the fact that over 80% was located in the tax-preferred coastal areas.43
38

Tseng, Wanda and Harm Zebregs, "Foreign Direct Investment in China: Some
Lessons for Other Countries", IMF Policy Discussion Paper PDP/02/03.
39

Zhang Tao, "Utilization of Foreign Capital and Economic Growth in China", 37
The Chinese Economy 62 (No. 1, 2004).
40

See Dees, Stephane, "Foreign Direct Investment in China: Determinants and
Effects", 31 Economics of Planning 175 (1998)
41

See e.g. Li, Gang and Guangyi Chen, "Direction of Chinese International Tax
Law under WTO Principles", in Liu, Jianwen (ed.), 8 Finance and Tax Law Review 281
(2006), at 298 (Beijing: Law Press China, 2006) (in Chinese); Cheng, Leonard K. and
Yum K. Kwan, "What are the Determinants of the Location of Foreign Direct
Investment? The Chinese Experience", 20 Journal of International Economics 375
(2000); and Tung, Samuel and Stella Cho, "The Impact of Tax Incentives on Foreign
Direct Investment in China", 9 Journal of International Accounting, Auditing & Taxation
105 (No. 2, 2000).
42

The annual value of FDI actually utilized in China is as follows: USD 4.1 billion
in 1979-1984, USD 1.9 billion in 1985, USD 34.8 billion in 1990, USD 37.5 billion in
1995, USD 40.7 billion in 2000, and USD 60.3 billion in 2005. Source: China Statistical
Yearbook (2006), available at www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2006/html/R1814E.xls (visited
on 10 July 2007).
43

Jiang, Xiaojuan, Yingxin Wang and Laike Yang, "A Study of the Gradual Shift
of Foreign Investment", 37 The Chinese Economy 19 (No. 5, 2004); Chen, Chun,
"Reflections on the Matter of Foreign Tax Preferences", [2005] International Taxation in
China, No. 7 at 31 (in Chinese). On the other hand, there are obvious non-tax factors that
are attractive to FDI: the special areas on the east coast generally have a longer history of
openess to investors; better infrastructure; a more open, transparent and efficient local
government; a better educated workforce; and higher purchasing power. Hon, Tai-Yuen,
Che-Cheong Poon and Kai-Yin Woo, "Regional Distribution of Foreign Direct
Investment in China: A Multivariate Data Analysis of Major Socioeconomic Variables",
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Using the FDI growth as a basis for asserting the effectiveness of tax
incentives is unreliable as it fails to identify the amount of FDI inflow that
would not have occurred in the absence of the tax incentives. More weight
may have been given to the tax incentives as an influencing factor. The
apparent correlation between the location of FDI in China's coastal areas
and the location-specific tax incentives is misleading as evidence of the
effectiveness of tax incentives because the general investment
environment in the coastal areas has been more conducive to investment
than the rest of China. Since most exports are competitive in labour costs
and there is little regulation regarding pollution, labour protection, health,
and safety controls, it is possible that labour-intensive, export-oriented
investment would have taken place anyway.
Historically, tax incentives have played a positive role in attracting FDI.
Granting tax incentives sent a clear signal of China's desire for investment
by foreigners. This signalling effect was historically important because
China suffered from serious image problems due to its previous hostile
policies towards foreign investors. The choice of the very word in the
Chinese language, "you hui" (preferences) for tax incentives conveyed a
positive message.44 Tax preferences were presented by China as gifts or
rewards to overseas investors.
Tax incentives appear to have been effective in attracting overseas
Chinese investors and investors looking for a low-cost manufacturing
base. Once the tax incentive regime was firmly in place, it became a
constant factor and had much less influence. For example, following
China's accession to the WTO, the fate of the FDI tax incentives was
publicly debated in China,45 but in spite of their uncertainty and possible
38 The Chinese Economy 56 (No. 2, 2005) (a fundamental determinant of regional
disparity in FDI in China in 1998–2003 was the overall socioeconomic environment in
the administrative regions).
44
45

Jiang, supra note 21, at 611.

See Guo, Hong, "Principles and Directions of China's Foreign Tax Incentives",
[2005] Taxation Research Journal, No. 11 at 14 (in Chinese); Ma, Guoqiang, "Current
Chinese Tax Incentives: Problems and Suggestions", [2003] Taxation Research Journal,
No. 3 at 34 (in Chinese); and Liang, Jiang, "Problems with China's Current Tax
Incentives for Science and Technology", [2001] Taxation Research Journal, No. 10 at 35
(in Chinese).
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elimination, FDI continued to increase in China. Investors who are lured to
China by its domestic market, such as retail, telecoms, banking, services
and certain consumer products, are less affected by tax incentives. Large
multinational enterprises are found to be less influenced by China's tax
incentives than small and medium-size firms.46 Presumably, multinationals
are more interested in the long-term investment environment than the
short-term effect of tax incentives. They can use tax planning techniques
to achieve an effective tax rate target that is much lower than the formal
tax rate.
Meanwhile, generous tax incentives have caused "round-tripping" in
China.47 Chinese investors, who would otherwise pay tax at least 10
percentage points higher than FIEs, have been motivated to set up entities
in tax havens to channel their investment in China. The People's Daily48
reported:
The British Virgin Islands is a major destination for China's
offshore investment. ... 10,000 out of 500,000 companies there are
from China. Most China-originated money entering tax havens will
re-enter China as "foreign investment" – "round-tripping". ... A
closer examination of China's star foreign direct investment (FDI)
46

Shan, Wenhua, "Law and Foreign Investment in China: General Role of Law
and Substantive Issues (part one)", 2 Manchester Journal of International Economic Law
41 (2005); Zhang, Yang and Hui Liu, "Analysis of the Impact of Taxation on FDI",
[2006] Taxation Research Journal, No. 4 at 39, 41 (in Chinese). Shan also reached this
conclusion in his empirical study; he noted that tax incentives were regarded as an
important factor in the location of FDI on the basis of the investors surveyed. However,
the "widely held assumption that Western investors do not care much about incentives"
remains valid as it reflects the opinions and experiences of large multinationals which
account for the vast majority of international investors in terms of the amount of their
investment, but a tiny minority in terms of their number.
47

In Easson, Alex J., "Tax Incentives for Foreign Direct Investment -- Part II:
Recent Trends and Countertrends", 55 Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation
12 (2001), at 367, the author argued that round-tripping may happen whenever tax
incentives are given only to foreign investors.
48

China Daily, "Investment outflows to tax havens", People's Daily Online, 22
June
2004,
available
at
english.peopledaily.com.cn/200406/22/eng20040622_147138.html (visited on 31 July
2007).
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figures reveals a large amount of capital going out of the country
and returning under a different guise. The World Bank and other
experts have estimated the scale of this round-tripping could be as
large as 20% to 30% of the total FDI inflow into China, but there is
no clear definition and detailed estimation method behind the
numbers. ... Even worse is that the trend is growing bigger. ... The
biggest pay-off for recycling mainland-originated money through a
web of companies offshore is the tax concessions that China grants
to foreign firms.
Round-tripping is clearly not the type of investment to be encouraged by
the tax incentives. Furthermore, the form of tax incentives (tax holidays)
tends to encourage short-term investment projects. To the extent that tax
incentives affected investment decisions, they encouraged investors to
terminate a project as soon as the tax holiday was over and start a new
project to qualify for a new tax holiday.
In lieu of FDI-specific tax incentives, China hopes to better attract FDI by
offering lower tax rates than other countries. The 25% general tax rate was
chosen because it was internationally competitive. The Minister of
Finance stated:49
[T]he level of enterprise income tax rates in the world, especially
the neighboring countries (regions), has to be taken into account.
The average enterprise income tax rate is 28.6 percent in 159
countries (regions) around the world in which an enterprise income
tax is applied, while that in China's 18 neighboring countries
(regions) is 26.7 percent. The rate of 25 percent set in the Draft is
relatively low in the world and will be conducive to enhancing
enterprise competitiveness and attracting foreign investment.

C. INTERNATIONAL TAX NORMS AND PRACTICES
As mentioned earlier, the enterprise income tax system came into
existence with the promulgation of the EJVIT (1980) and FEIT (1981)
49

Jin, supra note 33.
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Laws, both of which incorporated elements of the international tax norms.
In the interest of attracting FDI through tax policy and recognizing the
increasing globalization of China's economy, the drafters of the EIT Law
intended to move China's enterprise income tax system closer to the
international norms.
The basic structure of the EIT Law is based on the FIE Income Tax Law,
which incorporated many concepts and principles of corporate taxation
used in other countries. Adopting a uniform rate for all enterprises and
using tax incentives to encourage small business, research and
development, and other activities are consistent with the international tax
norms. For the first time, Chinese tax law has adopted a controlled foreign
corporations (CFC) rule, thin capitalization rules, and a statutory general
anti-avoidance rule.

D. ADMINISTRATIVE EFFICIENCY AND SIMPLICITY IN COMPLIANCE
The dual-track system was very complex to administer. Two separate
administrative regimes were required. Because the FIE Income Tax Law
was "international" and the Interim EIT Regulations were "domestic", tax
administrators virtually used different languages. The Chinese and foreign
partners of a joint venture had to work with two separate laws: the Interim
EIT Regulations for the Chinese partner and the FIE Income Tax Law for
the foreign partner. When a Chinese company was acquired by a foreign
investor, its tax status was transformed, and so was the system of tax
compliance.
Furthermore, the FDI-specific tax incentives were known to be misused
and abused by taxpayers.50 The above-mentioned round-tripping is just
one example. The tax incentive legislation gave a great deal of discretion

50

See Li, Tingxu, "Means of Tax Avoidance and Tax Evasion by Foreign
Investment Enterprises and Prevention Measures", [1999] International Tax Journal of
China, No. 8 at 62 (in Chinese); Tie, Wei, "Causes and Assessment of Tax Avoidance
under Current Tax System", [2005] International Taxation in China, No. 11 at 32 (in
Chinese); and Ye, Jun, "To Repeal or Not to Repeal the Foreign Tax Incentive Policies",
[2005] International Tax Journal of China, No. 11 at 28 (in Chinese).
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to the tax authorities to approve the tax incentives.51 The lack of
transparency and accountability in administering the tax incentive
legislation tended to lead to graft, corruption and rent-seeking.52 Local
governments engaged in fierce tax competition by lobbying the central
government for more tax preferences and offering tax incentives.53
The principle of making a tax payment easier and reducing the cost for
both taxpayers and tax administrators has always been important in China.
The lack of any history with a modern income tax system in China meant
that the fate of the modern tax system was largely determined by the
effectiveness of the administration and its efficiency. As such, this
principle was paramount in China. About half of the articles in the EJVIT
Law were devoted to administrative matters. In the new EIT Law, eight
out of 60 articles are administrative provisions. In addition, more rules are
prescribed in the Tax Collection and Administration Law. As compared
with its predecessors, the EIT Law is more transparent in terms of
taxpayers' obligations and the tax authorities' powers.

IV. MAJOR PROVISIONS OF THE NEW LAW
A. OVERVIEW
The EIT Law is a landmark piece of legislation in Chinese tax history. It
51

For example, Art. 8 of the FIE Income Tax Law states: "Any enterprise with
foreign investment which is engaged in agriculture, forestry or animal husbandry and any
other enterprise with foreign investment which is established in remote underdeveloped
areas may, upon approval by the competent department for tax affairs under the State
Council of an application filed by the enterprise, be allowed a 15% to 30% reduction of
the amount of income tax payable for a period of 10 years ...."
52

See Wei, S., Does Corruption Relieve Foreign Investors of the Burden of Taxes
and Capital Controls?, World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 2209 (1999); and
Drabek, Zdenek and Warren Payne, The Impact of Transparency on Foreign Direct
Investment, World Trade Organization, Staff Working Paper ERAD-99-02 (2001).
53

See Li and Chen, supra note 41; and Liang, Jiang, "China's Current Tax
Preferences of High-Tech and the Problems", [2001] Taxation Research Journal, No. 10
at 35 (in Chinese).
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not only unifies the FIE Income Tax Law and the Interim EIT Regulations,
but also introduces new concepts and provisions. The Minister of Finance
highlighted "four unifications": unification of the income tax law
applicable to both domestic and foreign-funded enterprises, unification of
the tax rates, unification and standardization of the deductions in
computing taxable income, and unification of the tax incentives.54 Most of
the new provisions deal with international tax avoidance transactions, such
as thin capitalization, transfer pricing, and foreign corporations located in
low-tax jurisdictions.
Consistent with China's legislative practice, most details for implementing
the EIT Law will be spelled out in the implementation regulations to be
promulgated by the State Council. At the time of writing (30 September
2007), these regulations have not been released. Because the EIT Law will
take effect on 1 January 2008, the lack of such detailed rules leaves many
taxpayers and their tax advisers in a state of uncertainty. The discussion
below is based on the text of the EIT Law.

B. LIABILITY TO TAX
Enterprises are subject to tax under the EIT Law. Resident enterprises are
subject to tax on their income from inside and outside China; non-resident
enterprises are subject to tax only on their Chinese-source income.
The concept of "enterprise" is not defined. It is "one of the most
perplexing aspects of Chinese enterprise law".55 An entity that is created
under the authority of a statute is clearly an "enterprise" whose existence
is distinct from the natural or legal persons who participate in its
operations. In some cases, government institutions give real and
meaningful effect to the existence of entities with no apparent statutory
basis or whose legal basis dictates consequences that seem at odds with

54
55

Jin, supra note 33.

Clarke, Donald C., "How Do We Know When an Enterprise Exists?
Unanswerable Questions and Legal Polycentricity in China", 19 Columbia Journal of
Asian Law 50 (2005).
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the consequences called for by a constitutionally superior law.56 The
uncertainty is more prevalent for domestically-funded entities because the
legal regime for FDI is more standard and transparent. Taxpayers under
the FIE Income Tax Law are "enterprises" under the EIT Law.
The term "resident" is defined as any legal person that is created under
Chinese law or has its effective management in China. A "legal person"
can be a Chinese-owned corporation57 or enterprise or an FIE. A legal
entity created under Chinese law is a resident by virtue of the place of
creation. A corporation created under foreign law is generally a nonresident of China, unless its place of effective management is in China.
China's tax treaties define "resident" in a manner similar to the definition
in Art. 4 of the OECD Model. A resident is a person liable to tax under the
laws of a contracting state by reason of domicile, residence, place of head
office, place of management, or any other criterion of a similar nature. If a
legal person has dual residence, the place of effective management is
typically the tie-breaker.
Non-resident enterprises are not taxable in China unless they derive
Chinese-source income. Foreign corporations carrying on business
operations in the form of a branch or through a partnership are subject to
Chinese tax on the profit derived from the activities in China.58 Business
income is taxable in China if the business is carried on through an
establishment or site in China. An "establishment" typically refers to a
management office, business site, office, factory, place of extraction of
natural resources, site for contracted projects (such as construction,
installation, assembly or exploration projects), site for furnishing services,
and a business agent (EIT Law, Art. 3). The concept is tied to the physical
presence of a foreign enterprise or its business agent in China. China's tax
56

Id.

57

Company Law of the People's Republic of China, Act of 19 December 1993.

58

Foreign corporations are allowed to carry on business activities in China in the
form of a branch (Company Law, id., Art. 119). They can also establish a representative
office but only if a Chinese enterprise sponsors it, and the activities of a representative
office are limited to indirect business operations, marketing, promotion, equipment
service and business communications. See Art. 4 of the Interim Regulations of the State
Council of the People's Republic of China Concerning the Control of Resident
Representative Offices of Foreign Enterprises, Act of 30 October 1980.
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treaties generally permit China to tax the business profits of an enterprise
in a treaty partner's country only if the profits are derived from a business
carried on through a permanent establishment in China.
Portfolio investment in China remains limited.59 In 2005, while the FDI
inflow was valued at over USD 603 billion, Chinese companies issued
USD 1.6 billion worth of shares overseas and entered into international
leasing transactions worth USD 1.08 billion.60 Technology transfers are
generally associated with FDI; FIEs imported more than half of the foreign
technology imported into China.61 Non-residents deriving dividends,
interest, rents and royalties from Chinese sources are subject to a 20%
withholding tax. China's tax treaties often reduce the rate to 10% or lower.
Capital gains derived by non-residents are taxable in China if the gains are
realized from the sale of buildings, structures and affiliated facilities, landuse rights in China, or other property situated in China.

C. TAXABLE INCOME
The determination of taxable income is generally the same as under the
FIE Income Tax Law. The details for the determination will be prescribed
in the forthcoming implementation regulations. In principle, a taxpayer's
taxable income is the amount of gross income62 reduced by deducting
excluded income,63 exempt income, costs and expenses, and loss carry59

Deriving portfolio income in China through a Chinese resident corporation is not
yet common. Chinese regulations generally require FIEs to be engaged in business
activities. Investment holding companies are allowed to hold investments only in the
same corporate group.
60

China
Statistical
Yearbook,
www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2006/indexch.htm.

available

at

61

Ministry
of
Commerce,
available
at
zhs.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/Nocategory/200707/20070704841184.html (visited on 12
July 2007).
62

"Gross income" is defined as "an enterprise's monetary and non-monetary
income from various sources" (EIT Law, Art. 6).
63

"Excluded income" is defined as income from fiscal funds such as fiscal
appropriations, administrative charges subject to fiscal administration, and government
funds (EIT Law, Art. 7).

2007] FUNDAMENTAL ENTERPRISE INCOME TAX REFORM IN CHINA 21

forwards (EIT Law, Art. 5).
Under the existing law, domestic enterprises and foreign-funded
enterprises are subject to different rules for deducting costs and expenses.
For example, domestic enterprises may deduct a limited amount of the
salaries and wages paid, while FIEs may deduct the actual amount paid.
The EIT Law unifies the deduction rules, allowing enterprises to deduct
the costs and expenses actually incurred. The EIT Law prescribes the
standards for deducting expenses only in the case of public welfare
donations (EIT Law, Art. 9) and defines the scope of non-deductible
expenses (EIT Law, Art. 10). Surprisingly, the loss carry-over is still
limited to a five-year carry-forward; no carry-back is allowed.

D. TAX RATES
Art. 4 of the EIT Law unifies the rates.64 The general rate is 25%, which is
much lower than the effective rate currently applicable to domestic
enterprises, but higher than that for FIEs.65 The 25% was considered to be
internationally competitive,66 although it is twice as high as that in Ireland
and Hong Kong.
A lower rate of 20% applies to small and low-profit enterprises. The
lowest rate of 15% applies to new and high-tech enterprises that are
supported by the state as key enterprises. The Minister of Finance
explained that the lower rates for high-tech enterprises and small and lowprofit enterprises are justified because they play a special role in the
national economy and, according to international practice, these types of
64

Under the existing law, the standard statutory tax rate is 33%. The rate is
lowered to 24% or 15% for FIEs in some special regions and to 27% or 18% for lowprofit domestic enterprises. There is a large disparity between the statutory tax rate and
effective tax rate as a result of various tax incentives.
65

The estimated amount of the tax reduction for domestic enterprises was CNY
134 billion and the tax increase for FIEs was CNY 41 billion, resulting in an overall
revenue loss of CNY 93 billion. The revenue decrease was considered acceptable to the
government; see Jin, supra note 33.
66

Jin, id. See the statement of Minister of Finance Jin regarding the tax rates
(quoted in the text at note 49, supra).
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enterprises receive support from the government in other countries.67 It is
expected that a significant number of FIEs will qualify for the lower rates.
Local governments may waive or reduce a portion of the tax that belongs
to the local government under the central-local fiscal arrangement.

E. TAX INCENTIVES
The new EIT Law abolishes most of the tax incentives discussed earlier.
Instead of targeting FDI, the new tax incentives encourage designated
activities or types of income in order to promote overall, sustainable
economic growth. Tax-preferred investments and activities include those
in agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, fisheries, public infrastructure,
environmental protection, conservation of energy and water resources,
research and development, and transfers of technology (EIT Law, Art. 27).
The forms of tax incentives are more flexible. In addition to the traditional
tax rate reductions, the EIT Law provides the following forms:
(a)
accelerated deductions for expenditures for research and
development, for fixed assets, and to create jobs for the disabled (EIT
Law, Art. 30);
(b)
additional deductions for a proportion of the capital contributions
to qualified venture capital enterprises (EIT Law, Art. 31);
(c)
exemption of income from the comprehensive utilization of
resources or manufacturing of products that are consistent with the state's
industrial policies (EIT Law, Art. 34);
(d)
exemption of interest on state bonds, dividends received from
resident corporations, dividends received by non-resident enterprises from
resident enterprises, and income of non-profit enterprises (EIT Law, Art.
26);
(e)
67

investment credit for investment in equipment used for
Jin, supra note 33.
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environmental protection, conservation of energy or water, or production
safety (EIT Law, Art. 31). Additional incentives may be granted to
enterprises in key industries or projects that are supported and encouraged
by the state (EIT Law, Art. 25); and
(f)
special relief authorized by the State Council for emergencies that
have a major impact on regular business activities (EIT Law, Art. 36).
It was feared that eliminating the existing tax incentives and increasing the
general tax rate for FIEs could potentially discourage FDI in China. To
ease this fear, Art. 57 of the EIT Law allows existing FIEs to continue to
pay tax at the lower rate of 15% or 24% until 2013 or to enjoy other types
of tax incentives (such as tax holidays) until the specified time period is
over. For existing FIEs that have not started enjoying the tax holidays
because they have not yet made a profit, the tax holiday will start in 2008
and end in 2013.
Overall, there is some continuity in China's tax incentive policy. High-tech
businesses continue to receive tax incentives in the form of a lower tax
rate (15%) as well as accelerated deductions for research and
development. The preferential tax policy continues to apply to investments
in agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, fisheries and infrastructure
construction. State-encouraged projects (such as those in Pudong and the
western regions) continue to qualify for tax incentives. The abolished tax
incentives include the tax rate reductions for FIEs in special areas and the
incentives for export-oriented FIEs.
4.6. Foreign tax credit
The foreign-source income derived by resident enterprises is taxable under
the EIT Law, subject to a foreign tax credit for the foreign income tax paid
on the foreign income (EIT Law, Art. 23). More specifically, the foreign
tax credit system operates on a worldwide basis. There is no distinction
between business income and passive income in determining the limit on
the foreign tax credit. Any excess credit may be carried forward for five
years, but not refunded.
For the first time, China allows an indirect foreign tax credit: a credit may
be claimed for any foreign corporate income tax attributable to the
dividends received by a Chinese corporate shareholder from a non-resident
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corporation that is controlled directly or indirectly by a Chinese resident
(EIT Law, Art. 24).

F. ANTI-AVOIDANCE RULES
The EIT Law contains the typical anti-avoidance rules found in other
countries. The Minister of Finance explained the need for such rules as
follows:68
Tax avoidance by some enterprises through various means is
serious, and the struggle against tax avoidance is intense. Thus, on
the basis of international practice, the Draft provides rules for
preventing tax avoidance through transfer pricing among
associated enterprises. It also provides general anti-avoidance rules
and articles against thin capitalization and avoidance through tax
havens. Moreover, it sets forth provisions for assessment
procedures and collection of interest from settling tax arrears as
provided for by the State Council. This will help guard against and
prevent tax avoidance and safeguard the interests of the state.
1. TRANSFER PRICING
The EIT Law provides the following rules to address transfer pricing,
which is recognized as a serious problem in China:69
68
69

Id.

Even with generally lower tax rates and generous tax incentives, multinational
corporations apparently use transfer pricing techniques to shift profits away from China.
This may appear to be surprising. But a closer look at the top source jurisdictions for the
FDI inflow to China reveals the motivation for some investors. Hong Kong does not tax
income derived from outside Hong Kong. Hence, savings in Chinese tax directly benefit
the investors. Barbados, the British Virgin Islands, the Caymen Islands, etc., are wellknown tax havens. Deflecting profits away from China to these jurisdictions reduces the
foreign investor's worldwide tax burden. In the past, Chinese tax law had a built-in
incentive for foreign investors to indefinitely prolong the loss period in that the tax
holidays started to run continuously from the first year of making a profit. Approximately
60% to 70% of FIEs reported tax losses. For further discussion, see Sherwood, Stanley G.
and Peter G. Chen, "China's Transfer Pricing Wall", [2002] Tax Planning International
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Article 41:
Where business transactions between an enterprise and its
associated enterprises are not based on the arm's length principle,
resulting in the reduction of the taxable income of the enterprise or
its associated enterprise, the tax authority has the power to make
adjustments based on any reasonable methods.
Costs associated with joint development, transfer of intangible
assets, or joint provision or receipt of services by an enterprise and
its associated enterprises should be allocated on the basis of the
arm's length principle for the purpose of computing taxable
income.
Article 42:
An enterprise may provide the tax authority with the
pricing principles and computation methods in respect of its
related party transactions. After negotiations and
verifications with the enterprise, the tax authority may enter
into an advance pricing arrangement with the enterprise.
Article 43:
When an enterprise files an annual enterprise income tax
return with the tax authority, it must also enclose an annual
report on its transactions with its associated enterprises.
When the tax authority conducts its investigation of related party
transactions, the enterprise, its associated enterprise, and any other
enterprise that is relevant to the investigation must provide the
relevant materials in accordance with the regulations.
Article 44:
When an enterprise fails to provide materials relevant to the related
party transactions, or provides false or incomplete information that
Transfer Pricing, No. 2 at 9, 10; Li, Jinyan, Chapter China, in The Tax Treatment of
Transfer Pricing (Amsterdam: IBFD Publications, loose-leaf); and Wu, Xiupo, "Reasons
for Transfer Pricing in China", [2001] International Taxation in China, No. 2 at 30 (in
Chinese).
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cannot truly reflect the reality of related party transactions, the tax
authority is authorized to assess the enterprise's taxable income in
accordance with the law and regulations.
These provisions incorporate the existing transfer pricing rules,70 which
generally follow the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines. For the first time,
however, the EIT Law addresses cost-sharing arrangements (see Art.
41(2)) and advance pricing arrangements (APAs) in the tax law (as
opposed to administrative guidelines). These developments are welcome
to multinational enterprises that would like to use these arrangements in
China. In the past, multinational companies were less willing to share
intellectual property or services with their Chinese subsidiaries for various
reasons, a key factor being that shared costs were not deductible for the
Chinese subsidiaries. Art. 41 now removes the tax obstacle by providing a
legal framework which may pave the way for China to attract more
advanced intangible property and sophisticated services from overseas.
Art. 42 recognizes the importance of APAs. The State Administration of
Taxation has developed an APA programme, and some bilateral APAs
have been concluded, involving Japan, South Korea and the United States.
Art. 48 of the EIT Law provides that an additional interest levy will be
imposed on the amount of adjustments made to transfer pricing
transactions. The levy is in addition to the normal tax arising from the
adjustment. This levy could be considered the "real teeth" of China's
transfer pricing regime. To date, there is no penalty for any transfer
pricing adjustments made by the authorities, except for the tax on the
adjustment itself. This reduces the incentive for taxpayers to comply until
they face a transfer pricing review or audit. The additional interest levy
may include a true interest component based on the time value of money
and a penalty component. In particular, a retrospective interest charge may
have a significant impact given that the tax authorities can investigate as
70

The most comprehensive set of guidelines is the "Tax Administration Rules and
Procedures for Transactions between Associated Enterprises (Trial)", [1998] Guo Shui
Fa, No. 59. This circular consists of 52 articles organized in 12 chapters. China's transfer
pricing rules generally follow the international concepts and the arm's length principle
expounded in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, although neither the FEIT Law nor
the 1998 transfer pricing circular specifically refers to the OECD Guidelines.
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far back as ten years. The EIT Law does not state whether the imposition
of the additional interest levy will be retrospective or prospective or the
rate of interest and methodology to be applied.
2. THIN CAPITALIZATION
The thin capitalization rule is found in Art. 46 of the EIT Law:
Interest accrued to the portion of debt exceeding the specified ratio
of debt and equity investment received from an associated
enterprise is not deductible in computing taxable income.
According to Art. 46, if the debt/equity ratio exceeds a specified level, the
excess interest cannot be deducted in computing taxable income. This is
the first thin capitalization rule in China. It applies to loans from related
parties only. Key concepts, such as "debt", "equity", "related party" and
"back-to-back loans", are expected to be defined in the forthcoming
implementation regulations.
3. CFC RULE
Taxpayers can defer the Chinese tax on foreign-source income through the
use of foreign corporations, typically located in a no-tax or low-tax
jurisdiction. For the first time, the tax law provides a rudimentary antideferral rule in Art. 45 of the EIT Law:
Where an enterprise that is established by a Chinese resident
enterprise in a jurisdiction pays tax at a rate obviously lower than
25% and does not distribute its profits for reasons other than
business needs, the amount of profit that should have been
distributed to the Chinese shareholder is included in the income of
the Chinese resident.
Unlike the anti-deferral rules of other countries (such as the US Subpart F
rules or the Canadian foreign accrual property income (FAPI) rules), Art.
45 of the EIT Law does not distinguish between foreign portfolio income
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and business income. Instead, it uses the "jurisdiction" approach by
applying the CFC rule to the total income of a CFC in a low-tax
jurisdiction (i.e. a jurisdiction whose tax rate is lower than the rate under
the EIT Law). In addition, Art. 45 has a "business reason/purpose" test -that is, the income that is retained by the CFC and not distributed to the
Chinese shareholders for business reasons is not subject to the imputed
dividend rule.
The target of imputed dividend taxation in Art. 45 is apparently the use of
tax havens by Chinese enterprises to keep funds away from China. It is
unclear whether making a portfolio investment outside China meets the
"business reason" test. It is also unclear how the State Administration of
Taxation plans to obtain information on offshore investments. Because
this rule applies only to enterprises, wealthy individuals are not affected
by it.
4. GENERAL ANTI-AVOIDANCE RULE
Art. 47 of the EIT Law provides:
Where an enterprise enters into an arrangement that has no
reasonable commercial purpose, thereby reducing its taxable
revenue or income, the tax authority has the power to make
adjustments based on reasonable methods.
This rule formally authorizes the Chinese tax authorities to make an
adjustment if the taxpayer enters into an arrangement without a
"reasonable commercial purpose". This is a strong signal of the tax
authorities' growing scrutiny of anti-avoidance schemes. Presumably, this
rule applies when a transactions avoids the application of specific antiavoidance rules. Art. 48 further provides:
Where the tax authority has made adjustments in accordance with
the above rules in this Chapter, the enterprise must pay the tax
arrears as well as a special interest levy imposed under regulations
promulgated by the State Council.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
The promulgation of the EIT Law is perceived to reflect "a growing
confidence in China's global standing, not only for lower cost
manufacturing, but as a consumer market with its own draw".71 Investors
and capital markets in China appear to welcome the new tax law as they
expect the large domestic companies -- the major banks, telecoms
companies, and oil and gas producers -- that dominate the indexes of
Chinese stock will see their after-tax earnings boosted by the tax
changes.72 Foreign investors looking for a more transparent and neutral tax
policy as part of the investment environment welcome the changes.
Similarly, established FIEs that have used up their tax holidays or are
engaged in activities that are tax-favoured under the new law (such as
research and development, infrastructure projects, and environmental
industries) stand to benefit under the new law.73 More importantly, foreign
manufacturers are making products for sale in China, seizing on its fastgrowing consumer market. The biggest concern thus far is the lack of
details for implementing the EIT Law. It is problematic that, at the time of
writing (September 2007), the State Council has not released the
implementation regulations.
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investment" because "what weighs in their decision is China's huge market potential".
Thus far, the negative reaction to the new law is based mostly on the lack of detailed
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According to Leander, supra note 71, some multinationals have adapted their
business plans to the policy changes. GE (General Electric) China has announced that it
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generators, seawater desalination technology, and energy-saving bulbs.

